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Abstract
The paper explores the possible consequences for academic research of increased
patenting in European universities. It underlines that most of the policy literature
refers to the advantages of university patenting without balancing them against the
costs or the risks involved in the activities. We provide a brief description of
university patenting activity in Europe examining both university-owned patents and
university-invented patents. The review of the literature reveals that unlike the United
States, little is known in Europe about the changes taking place in public research as a
result of increased patenting and increased institutionalisation of patents. We discuss
possible analytical approaches to identify both short-term and long-term effects.
Concluding remarks addressing the key issues for future empirical assessments are
presented in the last section.
Key words: University patenting, university-industry relationships, technology
transfer, European universities.
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1. Introduction
It is widely acknowledged that production activities rely more and more on scientific
and technical knowledge and that increasingly firms are drawing on the scientific and
technical expertise of Public Research Organisations (PROs). The ethos and incentive
structure of PROs have stressed the role of training (graduate and undergraduate) and
scientific publication as the means of delivering scientific and technological
knowledge to the public. In the open science model, access to scientific and
technological knowledge produced in PROs is free of additional costs; these
institutions are financed by government because they produce outputs that are
characterised by positive externalities beneficial to society as a whole. However, firms
may not necessarily have the capacity to assimilate and exploit the knowledge
produced by PROs (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989) and they may well fail to actually
benefit from this public research. Firms may need to develop upstream research
activities to be able to benefit from the available information and knowledge produced
by PROs, while PROs are being pushed to increase their effort in technology transfer
(TT) activities.
There are various forms of TT activities, ranging from development of new technical
artefacts (e.g. databases, software, patents) to research conducted in collaborations
between public and private organisations (e.g. via research contracts, university spin-
offs). But, as PROs become increasingly involved in TT activities, questions naturally
arise regarding the original mission of public research. To what extent are such TT
activities growing in PROs? Is the discovery of fundamental knowledge affected by
the rise in TT activities? Do upstream research and TT activities substitute for or
complement one another? How should researchers be rewarded for devoting part of
their time to TT activities?
This paper deals with the patenting activities of universities in Europe. It looks at the
impact of changes in Intellectual Property Right (IPR) systems on the research
activities of universities. The paper focuses on university patenting for two main
reasons. First, non-university PROs (such as research institutes, e.g. CNRS in France,
CSIC in Spain, etc.) are increasingly being subsumed by the university structure.
1 For
                                                          
1 This is more so in France, Italy and Spain than in Germany.4
example, in 2000, 743 of the 1,170 research units in the French CNRS were ‘mixed’
structures co-held by universities, while in 1992 this was 100 out of 1,297 (8%).
2
Second, most of the available literature focuses almost entirely on university research
(we were able to find only three articles dealing with changes in non-university public
research organisations). Thus, a focus on university patenting only, makes the inquiry
in this paper more consistent and allows better characterisation of the issues being
examined.
It is extremely difficult to assess the impact on academic research of an increased
reliance on IPR by universities because IPRs are just one of a set of new TT activities
developed over the last 10 to 20 years in European universities. However, opinion
about TT activities has shifted from their being seen as mainly engaged in managing
research agreements with firms, to the current view in which the primary task of TT is
to ‘assess and protect IP and make it available to industry’. All TT activities could
affect the way in which academic research is carried out: IPR is only one of multiple
factors that influence the behaviour of academic researchers. This paper, while
devoting particular attention to the impact of increased involvement in patenting by
universities, addresses the broader issue of increased TT activity in PROs.
The paper focuses on the possible consequences for academic research of increased
patenting in European universities. We acknowledge that IPR could have positive
impacts for the university exploiting them. The literature identifies the following:
  Increased financial resources (as a result of increased licensing and royalties)
that could be allocated on a discretionary basis perhaps to foster a new area of
research or to develop new teaching opportunities - both of which are usually
difficult to finance from traditional funding.
  Increased contract research funding for further developments into a final
product of the IPR.
  Creation of spin-off companies that are partially owned by the university.
  Faster exploitation of new inventions.
                                                          
2 Mixed structures are research units that are co-held by the CNRS and other organisations, most of
which are universities. Rapport d'activité du CNRS (2001).5
It is important to notice that most of the policy literature refers to these advantages
without balancing them against the costs or the risks involved in the activities.
3 The
advantages are presented with no supporting statistical empirical evidence and,
therefore, can only be considered to be assumptions. For example, the first of the
positive impacts listed above will only occur if the costs of running the TT operation
are counterbalanced by income. In the case of US and UK universities, for which
statistical evidence exists, most Technology Transfer Office (TTO) in universities do
not yield a positive net income (Nelsen, 1998; Charles and Conway, 2001). The
results of the recent OECD survey on patenting by PROs show that very few
organisations earn large sums of money while the majority make little or nothing out
of IPRs - between 10% and 60% of reporting organisations in the countries surveyed
reaped no income from IP though they had a TTO. Investing money in the
development of a spin-off company is a very risky activity with a very low success
rate: current data on the survival of these types of firms in a normal situation of scarce
availability of venture capital for further development (in the late nineties the
availability of venture capital was upwards biased due to the stock exchange bubble)
are not available. An example of the bias of the policy literature in favour of the
benefits can be clearly seen in the UK National Audit Office report ‘Delivering the
Commercialisation of Public Science’ (NAO, 2002). This report is based on a survey
of 155 university researchers.
4 Although the survey considers possible conflicts of
interest, such as differences in culture and incentives between the public and private
sectors and conflicts between the need to publish versus the confidentiality required
for patenting, discussion of the interviewees’ responses to these questions is relegated
to a few paragraphs in the appendix and provides incomplete information. The main
text of the report is devoted exclusively to analyse the benefits from and the means to
improve commercialisation.
This paper is organised as follows. In section two we give a brief description of
current activities in IP of PROs in European countries. We focus on both university-
owned patents and university-invented patents (patents with at least one inventor
working at a university). Section three provides a review of the literature on the
                                                          
3 See, among others, OECD (2002a) and NAO (2002).6
changes taking place in public research in Europe as a result of increased patenting
and increased institutionalisation of patents (in recent years in a large number of
European countries ownership of patents has been transferred to universities). Given
the scarce literature available (especially on the impact in Europe), in section four we
discuss possible analytical approaches to identify both short-term and long-term
effects. Concluding remarks addressing the key issues for future empirical
assessments are presented in the last section.
2. University patenting in European countries
In the past decade, universities have witnessed substantial changes in terms of
research objectives and sources of funds. First, universities were gradually required to
diversify the sources of their financial resources. Government structural funds
substantially declined (at different levels in different countries, for example, the
decline was much more significant in the UK than in France) and have been partially
substituted by competitive funds (Geuna, 2001). Government structural funds are
those financial resources allocated to universities through public budgetary channels.
Structural funds have been the cornerstone of European university research since the
Second World War. However, the budget constraints of the eighties and early nineties
and the changes in the rationale for the public support of science incentivised
governments to allocate funds through new, more competitive channels in the form of
problem-oriented or industry-oriented public programmes. The general decline in
public structural funds has been partially compensated for by the increase of funds
from non-profit organisations and by tighter relationships between university and
industry. Overall, university researchers and university research centres are now
clearly encouraged to embark on collaborations with private companies (Geuna,
2001).
Second, changes in financial resources have entailed corresponding changes in the
legal status of researchers. Researchers are incentivised to complement their research
activities with technology transfer activities. For example, in France researchers now
have the right to spend a proportion of their time in industry (Llerena, Matt and
                                                                                                                                                                     
4 The researchers were sampled from a population of researchers funded by the Biotechnology and
Biological Sciences Research Council, the Medical Research Council and the Natural Environment
Research Council.7
Schaeffer, 2003). It should be noted that such legal changes have yielded changes in
the incentive or reward structures within universities. In a number of EU countries,
researchers may now receive a portion of the royalties derived from their patented
discoveries, even though the patent legally belongs to the institution in which the
discovery was developed.
Changes in the university IPR system should be seen as a central device for the
enhancement of TT activities and financial resources. It is not clear what might be the
implications of these changes for the future of academic research. A thorough survey
of the literature points to the fact that not only is there little empirical evidence on the
changes in academic research at the European level but also that there are very few
reliable data on the phenomenon of university patenting per se.
If we exclude the US and Canada, where the annual survey of the Association of
University Technology Managers (AUTM)
5 was carried out for the first time in 1995,
there is very little reliable historical data on patenting and licensing by PROs for the
other OECD countries.
In the UK a report on the first annual survey of university commercialisation activity
by the University Companies Association (UNICO) has been produced (UNICO and
NUBS, 2002). A response rate of 80% (63% if we exclude nil responses) accounting
for about 85% of research spending in UK universities in 2001, provides a good
picture of the current situation in the UK. The 77 universities that responded account
for 1,402 invention disclosures, 743 patent applications and 276 patents granted. The
majority (56%) of the responding institutions had not had any patents granted. 60% of
respondents earned less than £50,000 from licences (while 40% received no income at
all from licences); for 68% of institutions expenditure on IP management was less
than £50,000 but only 14% had no expenditure for this item. Comparing these results
with those of the latest AUTM survey (AUTM 2002), it can be seen that the UK is
behind both US and Canada in terms of income from licensing, number of licences
executed and, in particular, number of patents issued.
                                                          
5 For Canada see also the Survey of Intellectual Property Commercialisation in the Higher Education
Sector, 1999 by Statistics Canada.8
The OECD (OECD, 2002a) has recently made an attempt to systematically collect
data on the patenting activity of PROs; however, as pointed out in the conclusion to
the first chapter of the OECD report, the results of the OECD survey should be read
with extreme caution as most of the responses are partial or incomplete.
Cesaroni and Piccaluga (2002) constructed a database of comparable data for France,
Italy and Spain on PRO institutionally granted patents from the European Patent
Office (EPO) and the US Patent Office (USPTO) during the period 1982-2002. PROs
in these three countries were granted respectively 911, 723 and 127 patents. CNRS,
CNR and CSIC are the three PROs with the highest number of patents. It is interesting
to note that in France and Italy only about 10% of the granted patents are owned by
universities, while in Spain universities own nearly 50%. Finally, the study highlights
the high level of co-patenting activity with between 20% and 30% of the patents
having more than one assignee (more than 50% of such patents are with firms).
In Belgium, Finland, France, Germany and Italy, the data on IPR available at TTO
(patents owned by universities such as those included in the database of Cesaroni and
Piccaluga or the OECD survey) for the eighties and nineties are downward biased due
to the habit of researchers/professors to leave ownership of the patent be assigned to
the firm that financed the research project but to be included in the list of inventors or
to apply individually as patent assignee. We define university invented patents as
patents with a member of a university faculty among the inventors, whether or not the
university is the assignee of the patent. The studies by Balconi et al. (2002), Meyer
(2002) and Saragossi and van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie (2003) provide clear
empirical evidence that the number of university invented patents is much higher than
the number of patents owned by universities. Balconi et al. (2002) identified that out
of 1,300 university inventor patents in Italy in the period 1979-1999 only 90 EPO
patents had university assignees
6 whereas Italian university inventor patents account
for 3.8% of EPO patents by Italian inventors. Meyer (2002) reports that Finnish
universities own 36 USPTO patents, but that there were 530 Finnish university
inventor patents in the period 1986-2000. Similarly, in Germany university assignee
patents are relatively rare, but university invented patents have continuously increased
                                                          
6 The authors point out that this is a lower bound estimate because their search on university inventor
patents was based only on university faculty active in 2000.9
from less than 200 in the early 1970s to around 1,800 in 2000 (OECD, 2002b). There
are no aggregate data for Belgium, but Saragossi and van Pottelsberghe de la
Potterie’s (2003) study points out that the number of university invented EPO patents
for Université Libre de Bruxelles (ULB) is more than double the number of university
owned patents for the whole period 1985-1999.
7 Similarly, no aggregate data are
available for France; however, Azagra-Caro and Llerena (2003) stress that in France
though legally the university has the right to own the patent, in practice the most
common form of university patents was and still is the university invented one. They
offer statistical evidence relating to the University Louis Pasteur in Strasbourg. In the
period 1993-2000, the university had 463 patents (French patent office, EPO and
world patents) of which only 62 were owned by the university.
In the US 41% of academic USPTO patents in 1998 were in three areas of
biomedicine indicating a strong focus on developments in the life sciences and
biotechnology fields. In terms of revenues, about half of total royalties were related to
life sciences (including biotechnology) (NSF, 2002). The situation is less clear-cut in
Europe. On the one hand, the results of the OECD PRO IP survey seem to point to
less dominance by the bio-medical area, but, on the other, Cesaroni and Piccaluga’s
data point to clear dominance of the broadly defined area of Chemistry and Human
Necessities (which includes biotechnology). The data on university inventor patents in
Belgium, France, Finland and Italy show that the technological areas with the highest
frequency are those relating to biotechnology and pharmaceuticals (Azagra-Caro and
Llerena, 2003; Meyer, 2002; Saragossi and van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, 2003):
the case of Italy is striking in that about 30% of Italian EPO patents in biotechnology
include at least one academic inventor (Balconi et al. 2002). However the strongest
technological sectors in each country (for instance, information and communication
technology in Finland) tend also to have a very high frequency in university patents.
Three preliminary conclusions can be drawn from the analysis of European university
patents. First, the scientific field with the highest activity across countries is
biomedicine. Second, historical developments in Italy and Germany seem to confirm
the view that university patenting is not a new phenomenon and its development (as
                                                          
7 Informal discussion confirms this result, though in a less striking way, for two other Belgian
universities.10
pointed out by Mowery et al. (2001) Nelson (2001) and Mowery and Ziedonis (2002)
for the US) is due more to the growing technological opportunities in the bio-medical
(and maybe ICT) area than to policy regulation.
8 It is interesting to note that two
studies, one by Gulbrandsen and Smeby (2002) on Norway and one by Ranga (2003)
on Belgium, have found some evidence of industrial funding being linked to
university patenting (the direction of causation is not clear). This result could provoke
speculation that the increase in university patenting has been indirectly affected by
policy actions that have forced university research to become more reliant on
industrial funding. Third, although interesting, the data from the PRO IP survey
conducted by the OECD on institutionally owned patents are not sufficient; national
data on university invented patents, such as the used in the studies developed for all
the above countries, should be gathered from the same patent offices to ensure
comparability.
3. Changes in public research a survey of current evidence
This section focuses on the changes in public research provoked by the diffusion of
IPR. As very few studies have examined this issue at the European level, we will also
discuss a few studies that have examined the changes in public research from the
broader perspective of increased interaction between universities and firms via,
among others, research contracts, university spin-offs and patents.
In the last 10 years American universities have been much more active than their
European counterparts in enforcing and exploiting IPRs on the research carried out by
their researchers. Between the late 1980s and the end of the 1990s the number of
USPTO patents granted to US academic institutions more than tripled and by 2002
numbered nearly 3,300. This rapid growth was paralleled by the development of
specialised management/administrative organisations (including a complementary
number of patent lawyers) within universities devoted to the economic exploitation of
academic research, by the creation in the science curricula of specialist training in
patent law and, as the result of a some major public mishaps, by the development of a
code of conduct designed to cope with potential conflicts of interests. Two major
implications of this radical organisational innovation: the impact on academic
                                                          
8 See also the study on patenting output from the Chalmers University of Technology in Sweden by
Wallmark (1997).11
research and the legal aspects connected with the ownership of property rights, have
attracted the attention not only of scientists and practitioners but also of the wider
public via the discussion of these issues in the national press. 
9
Analysing the impact of university IPR on academic research in Europe requires that
two separate aspects be taken into account. First, we need to consider the impact of an
increase in university IPR: does increased involvement in IPR by university
researchers affect their research activity? Second, the move by universities towards
institutional patenting – i.e. the institutionalisation of patenting being one of the
activities of university researchers — could result in the creation of a new incentive
structure that would affect the behaviour of academic staff.
These two aspects are equally important. The OECD ST&I Outlook 2002 report
(OECD, 2002b) discusses in some detail the advantages of institutional ownership
over individual ownership of IPR in PROs; here we want to put forward two more
reasons that would justify an institutional approach. First, such an approach allows the
potential sharing of benefits with the TTO, the inventor, the department/faculty of the
inventor and the rest of the university, recognising that although it is possible to
identify only one inventor, many factors (people and infrastructure) have contributed
to the realisation of the invention. However, it should be noted, that there is very little
evidence of any active redistribution of the profits across departments.
10 Second,
given the high costs of patent applications, in the case of contract research with
industry, there is, as we have already said, a tendency to assign ownership rights to
the firm in exchange for direct compensation that precludes the possibility of future
claims for rewards based on the invention. While there does seem to be some
justification for institutional ownership of a patent, this type of management of
university IP may also induce an exacerbation of the effects connected with a rise in
university IPR. For example, the results of the TTO/OECD survey provide some
empirical evidence that IP activity does already ‘have a positive influence on the
                                                          
9 A large number of academic, policy and practitioner works which examine the US context have
recently been published. See, among others, Blumenthal et al. (1997), Campbell et al. (2000), Cohen
(2001), Nelson (2001), Thursby et al. (2001), Campbell et al. (2002) and Jensen and Thursby (2002).
10 Given the constraints on funding for university teaching and research, particularly in the case of
European universities where independent sources of funds such as endowments or alumni are usually
negligible, income from IPR, if it materialised, could become a potentially very important source of12
recruitment and careers of researchers and a stronger influence on earnings’ (OECD
2002a, p. 27). If this is the case, the institutionalisation of IPR could greatly influence
the behaviour of researchers. Let us assume that the reasons for research activity are:
1) curiosity - researchers gain pleasure from the discovery process; 2) reputation -
researchers want to become famous; they want to contribute to posterity; 3) career -
researchers aspire to achieving tenured chairs, they want to make progress in their
careers; 4) research money for the creation and development of a research team and 5)
personal money - researchers are only human and generally therefore have the desire
to make more money. An institutional IPR will directly affect the third and fourth of
these aims and probably also the second. Researchers will therefore likely react very
quickly to the new incentive structure and divert part of the time and effort previously
devoted to publishing, teaching and administration, to the new activity of patenting.
11
There have been some recent studies that have analysed the impact on European
academic research of increased reliance on industrial funding. The majority are case
studies of a university with little supporting statistical evidence. Two studies, one by
Gulbrandsen and Smeby (2002) on Norway and one by Ranga (2003) on the Katholik
Universiteit van Leuven (KUL) in Belgium examine the issue based on statistical
data. The survey of university faculty in Norway
12 produced evidence on the impact
of increased TT activity by universities. First, faculty with funding from industry
perform significantly less basic research than researchers with no external funds or
other types of external funds; however, researchers with industrial funding carry out
less experimental development than researchers with no external funds. Second, about
20% of respondents reported that contract research is problematic with regard to
autonomy and independence of research (the share of researchers with industrial
funding drops to 12%). Finally, confirming the results of Canadian and US studies,
this survey produced evidence that faculty with industrial funding publish more than
other researchers. The analysis across fields (unfortunately only briefly reported in the
survey) confirms this result for researchers with no external funding, but the
                                                                                                                                                                     
money, not tied to a specific activity, that the university could use to develop new (or currently under-
funded) research or teaching areas.
11 Section 4 discusses in greater detail the motivations behind the researcher’s decision to patent.
12 The survey, carried out  in 2001, included all faculty member with the position of assistant professor
or higher in Norway’s four universities. The survey had a response rate of 60%. Similar ‘university
census’ surveys were carried out in 1982 and 1992.13
difference is not significant in all fields of learning for researchers with other external
funds.
The preliminary study by Ranga (2003) provides some tentative evidence that there
was no shift towards applied research publication in KUL during the period 1985-
2000 though the university received increased funds from industry in that period.
Also, Ranga presents some preliminary evidence to show that, in the case of KUL, the
total number of publications by research groups has a positive correlation with
contract funding.
Unfortunately, none of the surveys conducted by TTO associations (either in
US/Canada, or in Europe) addresses the issue of the impact upon academic research
of increased patenting and increased institutionalisation of patenting.
13 We were able
to identify only two studies that directly addressed the issue of the impact of increased
university patenting on academic research in Europe: by Webster and Packer (1997)
and the European Commission (2002).
Webster and Packer’s (1997) study examines the results of a questionnaire involving
UK universities and a set of semi-structured interviews with TTO managers, patent
agents, patent examiners and industrialists in the UK in 1993. In addition to a set of
questions on patenting and licensing by UK universities the survey addressed the
issue of disclosure and dissemination of research results. Although they do not report
statistical results, the authors claim that ‘it is apparent from our survey that academic
dissemination can be compromised’. On the basis of both the survey results and the
interviews, they point out that a number of respondents have become much more
strategic in their choice of what information to disclose in their publications to avoid
the possibility of a future patent application being compromised.
The European Commission (2002) report summarises the results of a survey of public
and private researchers designed to investigate the issue of publication delay. The
survey was probably carried out in the late 1990s (the report does not provide this
information).
                                                          
13 See, for example, the content of the AUTM Licensing Survey - FY 2000 (2002) and the UNICO and
NUBS University Commercialisation Activities Survey - FY 2001 (2002).14
The report identifies the policy concerns that: ‘a public research policy that supports
both rapid dissemination to foster scientific progress and patenting to support
exploitation of the results of publicly funded research has to establish framework
conditions that help researchers to avoid conflicts of interest, e.g. ensures rapid
publication while giving protection to the results’ (European Commission, 2002: 10).
The survey was carried out to assess the current situation in order to be better able to
establish framework conditions.
The report identifies three main results:
  A small fraction of researchers cited considerable delay in publication of
research results; the less experienced users of the patent system experience the
highest delay.
  Public research sector researchers strongly favour the introduction of a grace
period.
  Public research sector researchers support the idea of filing a provisional
patent application as an alternative to a grace period.
Figure 1 presents the responses to the question about whether a delay in scientific
publication had occurred (could occur) on results that had been (could be) the subject
of a patent application. Though the report claims that only a small fraction of
researchers experienced a considerable delay, when we focus on academic researchers
it is clear that a large majority of respondents had experienced some degree of delay.
{FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE}
Though we praise the intention to collect new and much needed data on the possible
effect of increased reliance on IPR in PROs, they way in which the data were
collected and analysed in this survey rendered the conclusions of the report very
unreliable. Out of the 1,500 questionnaires administered, 154 respondents were from
PROs, either individuals or institutions that have used or were planning to use the
patent system. Though not explicitly stated in the report, it would seem that the
statistical analysis was carried out on a sub-sample of the respondents in order to
achieve 50:50 ratio institutional to individual responses. The report does not specify15
who were the institutional respondents, which makes the interpretation of results
problematic. For example, quite different answers would be expected from a member
of the central university administration and a member of the technology transfer
office. Furthermore, the statistics come from a mix of institutional and individual
responses, which limits the possibility of their interpretation even more. Finally, the
fact that the questions were asking about something that has happened and something
that could happen mixes factual responses with opinion based ones.
Indirect evidence about the relation between academic research and university
patenting is offered in the study by Azagra-Caro and Llerena (2003). They develop a
model to explain the characteristics of the laboratories at the University Louis Pasteur
that affect their patenting output. They found some empirical evidence to support the
view that the laboratories of more prestigious (in terms of institutional recognition)
institutions tend to patent more. However, they conclude that much more detailed data
are needed to come to robust conclusions.
The scant evidence on the impact of increased IPR in universities and the lack of
comparable data across European countries and over time, prevent any firm
conclusions being drawn about the impact of increased IPR on the characteristics of
public research. Therefore, in the next section we will examine how the impact of
increased patenting in universities can be assessed analytically.
4. Analytical approaches
The above sections have reviewed the small available literature on recent changes in
university patenting in European countries and their potential implications. This
section focuses on the development of analytical approaches to assess the possible
consequences of increasing university patenting and increased institutionalisation of
patenting. Five main possible negative impacts can be identified. They are:
  Negative impact upon the culture of open science, in the form of increased
secrecy (reduced willingness to share data with colleagues), delays in
publication, increased costs of accessing research material or tools, etc.16
  Substitution effect between publishing and patenting. Particularly important is
the possible different impact depending on the age of researchers. A
hypothesis worth testing is that older researchers may have the ability to
publish and patent at the same time, without substitution effect, because they
have already accumulated intellectual capital while for young researchers,
publishing activity has a greater effect than patenting on the formation of
intellectual capital.
14 Hence, young researchers that are active in patenting
from the start of their careers, may prove to be less productive in the long-
term.
  Diverting research resources (researchers’ time and equipment) from the
exploration of fundamental long-term research questions that tend not to be
suited to the development of IPRs. This impact is strongly affected by the
scientific field.  In some cases such as transfer sciences (Blume 1990) or
‘Pasteur’s Quadrant’ sciences (Stokes, 1997 e.g. biotechnology or ICTs), the
distinction between fundamental/basic research and applied research does not
hold. However, for other sciences, such as physics, in which the distinction
between basic and applied research is more pronounced, the diversion of
resources can have major consequences.
  Threat to future scientific investigation from IPR on previous research. In
theory, patent law provides a research and experimental use exception that
allows university researchers to use patented inventions for their research
without being obliged to pay licence fees. However, this exception can be
weak if the firm that obtains the exclusive right to exploit a patent decides that
the research exception is not applicable to university projects financed by
industry.
15
  Threat to teaching quality. Teaching is not associated with a heavy weighting
in the assessment of the performance of university professors, thus teaching
                                                          
14 It is interesting to note that recent attempts to increase publication output have resulted in shorter and
less inclusive (less scholarly) types of articles. This phenomenon is affecting the relationship between
publications and intellectual capital formation in a negative way.
15 See for example the case of Ariad Pharmaceuticals that owns the exclusive licence to a key
biological trigger, the NF-κ B messenger protein (Brickley, 2002).17
has a low impact on their careers. If patent output is to be used in the academic
evaluation process (as is already happening in a few countries and as is being
promoted by some policy reviews), this will create incentives for researchers
to reduce their time/commitment to some of their activities - and, given the
current weighting scheme, teaching will be the activity likely to suffer the
highest time reduction.
16
To bring new insights to the debate, we introduce some in depth analyses on the
choices made by researchers to patent or to publish. These contributions help to
formalise the behaviour of faculty researchers and allow a distinction to be made
between short and long-term impacts. In the short-term approach, structural funds and
IPR are considered as exogenous, i.e. given to researchers, and thus the ability of
researchers and, to a larger extent, the capacity of universities to patent are examined
and related to publication rate. We analyse firstly the likely effects of EU
fragmentation and the introduction of a grace period on researchers’ decisions to
patent or publish. Secondly, we investigate the potential and cumulative consequences
that the decline in structural funds is likely to yield, bearing in mind that only few
patents become economically valuable.
4.1 The researchers’ decision to patent or to publish
This section is concerned with how researchers decide to patent or publish and,
ultimately, how they allocate their time between basic and applied research. There are
only a few published contributions in this area. The first contribution is empirical and
is based on two university case studies (Owen-Smith and Powell, 2001). Owen-Smith
and Powell suggest that the faculty researcher’s decision to patent (or not) follows a
cost-benefit analysis. This is consistent with Jensen and Thursby’s (2002) static
model. We present these complementary views in the next two subsections because
they provide a detailed description and/or representation of the mechanisms that
condition faculty researchers to patent.
Researchers’ Perceptions of University Patenting
                                                          
16 See Stephan (2001) for a broader description of the educational implications of university-industry
technology transfer.18
Drawing on qualitative data gleaned from 68 interviews, Owen-Smith and Powell
(2001) develop an explanation for widely disparate rates of knowledge disclosure by
means of patents and explore the reasons why researchers would be willing or not to
patent. Not surprisingly, the qualitative results suggest that the researcher’s decisions
are based on: (i) their perceptions of the personal and professional benefits of
patenting; (ii) their perceptions about the time and resource costs of interacting with
TTOs; (iii) their immediate environment, i.e. general view of technology transfer.
A key finding was that the decision to disclose patentable knowledge follows a cost-
benefit analysis. If the cost exceeds the expected benefits, the researcher will
rationally reject patenting. As to what are perceived as benefits, the results differ
greatly between the physical and the life sciences (see table 1), but researchers from
both fields agree that pecuniary incentives are undoubtedly major driving forces.
Researchers decide to patent because they perceive positive personal (obviously
pecuniary, but also curiosity) and professional (prestige, validation of basic research,
freedom of public research) outcomes from establishing intellectual property
protection. Table 1 presents the expected benefits from patent outcomes by faculty
researchers.
{Table 1 ABOUT HERE}
The cost structure of university patenting is somewhat less clear. The qualitative
results in Owen-Smith and Powell’s study suggest that the cost structure is: (i) a
negative function of past patenting by the researcher - past experience with the legal
aspects of knowledge appropriation should reduce future patenting efforts; (ii) a
negative function of the level of expertise in the university technology transfer
offices; (iii) a negative function of the quality of interactions with the university
technology transfer offices. An additional result that comes out of their research is
that the cost-benefit analysis conducted by researchers is influenced by the faculty to
which they belong. The widespread awareness of success and patent benefits, the
supportive peer environment and the ascription of academic status to commercial
success are all factors that contribute to an institutional environment in which both
basic and applied research are likely to be undertaken simultaneously (Owen-Smith
and Powell, 2001: 113).19
On the whole, the decision of researchers to patent or not is likely to be based on a
cost-benefit analysis. In a recent paper, Jensen and Thursby (2002) investigated the
effect of changes in patent policy on academic research by developing a formal
representation of the faculty researcher’s decision to patent or publish that is
consistent with the empirical assessment made by Owen-Smith and Powell. Because,
to our knowledge, this is the only attempt to model such an issue, it is worth
presenting its construction in detail.
General Modelling of the Researchers’ Allocation of Time Resources between Applied
and Basic Research
To address the problem of university research and education, i.e. teaching, Jensen and
Thursby (2002) analyse the allocation by faculty of time to three types of tasks: basic
research, leading to publication k, applied research, leading to patent application p,
and quality of teaching q. What is analysed is not the aggregate level of output for the
university but the equilibrium at which both the university, as an administrative entity,
and the researchers, maximise their respective utility. Because researchers may at any
time exit to a next best alternative outside the university, the model is explicitly a
principal-agent problem.
The model starts from the faculty decision on wages w and teaching load e for each
researcher. Given this information, researchers decide to allocate their time share
between two types of research: basic or applied. Let b and a be the fraction of time
dedicated to basic and applied research respectively (e + a  + b  = 1). Current basic
research and teaching load will determine the researcher’s wage for the next period,
while changes in the number of licences provide an additional income. Licences are a
simple, linear function of the stock of patentable knowledge L = L(p). The
researchers’ set of preferences is of two types: pecuniary, i.e. income Yr, and non-
pecuniary, i.e. research effort (curiosity, pleasure in doing research) and prestige. It is
assumed that a fraction φ  of the royalties goes to the faculty inventor, while the
fraction (1-φ ) goes to the university. From the university, or university administration,
point of view, the objective is to increase the university’s prestige and income. Thus,20
the researchers and administration utility functions are respectively  ) p ; k ; Y ; b ; a ( U r r  and
) p ; k ; Y ( U A A , ) p ( L w Y with r ⋅ + = φ  and  w ) p ( L ) ( ) q ( E YA − ⋅ − + = φ 1 .
The researcher’s problem is thus to choose the amount of effort, i.e. the time spent (a
and b) on both applied and basic research, so as to maximise his/her current utility Ur
subject to time constraints and given wages w and teaching load e, while the
administration’s utility function is itself a function of the researcher’s time spent by
the researcher on research and education.
17 The administration problem is to choose
the researcher’s wage w and q so as to maximise his/her current utility UA. Given this
simple representation, and assuming that the optimal solution is decreasing in a and
increasing in b, the model yields the following results.
1.  Whether the researcher specialises in basic or applied research, or spends time
on both, depends on the marginal rate of substitution of applied for basic
research (mrsab). If mrsab is superior to unity, the researcher specialises in
applied research (a = 1 - e, b = 0); if inferior to unity, she specialises in basic
research (b = 1 - e, a = 0). If mrsab is equal to unity, the researcher splits her
time between a and b. Whether policy changes have the effect of increasing
university patenting depends on how these changes affect the rate of
substitution of applied for basic research.
2.  Regarding the quality of teaching q, the outcome of the model remains
ambiguous, but as the authors state, policies that encourage university patenting
are likely to have a negative effect on the quality of teaching. The reason for
this is that an increase in the stock of patentable knowledge increases the
quality of teaching only if such knowledge is used in education. But the
administration may establish a lower q to allow the researcher to spend less
time on educating, i.e. more time in either a or b. In other words, it is likely that
a decrease in time spent on education will not be offset by an increase in the
quality of the knowledge used in education.
                                                          
17 This model does not include the possibility of buying-out the teaching load.21
3.  Interestingly enough, the model shows that changes in the share of licence φ
have no effect on the optimal wages w and the quality of teaching q.
The above model has been developed in order to investigate the effect of changes in
patenting policies in universities on its two secular missions: education and research.
The results are ambiguous for teaching, and they do not provide sufficient insights
into whether such changes (in patent policies) will affect the balance between applied
and basic research. However, there are a number of other important findings. First, the
rise in applied research might not lead to less basic research. The wage policy and the
quality of teaching will actually determine the final decision of the researchers about
how their time is split between basic and applied research. Second, the quality of
teaching is quite likely to suffer from an increase in applied research if research
outputs systematically become codified in patents. Should this happen, little room
would be left for dissemination of knowledge through education. In summary, what
can be inferred from the foregoing is that:
1.  If the costs of patenting outweigh the benefits, the researcher will decide not to
patent (Owen Smith and Powell, 2001).
2.  If the marginal increase in the utility function from an additional patent is
lower than the marginal increase in the utility function from an additional
publication, then the researcher is likely to opt for publication, depending on
her/his wage w and teaching load q (Jensen and Thursby, 2002).
Unfortunately, the model does not make the wage w conditional on past patenting.
The inventor’s incentive to patent is thus only conditional on expectations of future
revenues, i.e. licence fees linked to the patent. But it is widely acknowledged that the
economic value of patents shows wide variation. Most patents have a little economic
value, but few become the rare ‘golden egg’. Suppose that w were to become
conditional on past patenting, this incentive scheme would be consistent with, though
not rigorously equivalent to, those that condition professional careers on researchers’
patenting activity. The latter amounts to assuming that ceteris paribus, researchers
may be more interested in patenting than publishing, so that the marginal rate of22
substitution of research of applied for basic research mrsab becomes increasing in a
and decreasing in b.
4.2 Key Issues Revisited
The model provides a useful framework within which to discuss the issues that have
gained momentum in Europe. On this basis, we first investigate the effect of the
fragmentation of the European patent systems on university patenting. We find that if
this fragmentation is a hurdle for both public and private researchers, faculty
researchers are likely to systematically opt for publication to avoid the additional
costs induced by this fragmentation. The introduction of ’grace periods’ is then
discussed so as to deduce its possible consequences. Finally, we study the impact of
scarcer structural funds in a world of skew-distributed outcomes.
The Fragmentation of European Patent Systems
What does the model say in the case of a fragmented system, such as is the case in
Europe? The above model helps us to formalise the choices of the researchers with
respect to patenting or publishing. Assuming (i) substitution between publishing and
patenting; (ii) that basic and applied research induce non-redeployability of the
research result from a to b and vice versa (a ∩  b = ∅ ), the choice of the researcher
between patenting and publishing is proportional to the time a and b that she chooses.
Building on the previous model, it is quite likely that the fragmented patent system
leads to larger costs for actually applying for a patent. The productivity of the time a
spent on applied research is likely to decrease substantially, as, in turn, would the
number of licences L(p). A simple numerical exercise shows that following a linear
assumption, a duplication (or a multiplication by x) of the time spent in applying for
patents equates with a division by two (or by x) of the number of applications. In other
words, the marginal rate of substitution between basic and applied research, leading
unequivocally to publication and patenting respectively, will become inferior to unity,
leading the researcher to systematically specialise in basic research.
Based on the model, the multiplicity of patent systems in Europe will make it difficult
for any Europe-wide policy in favour of university patenting to be implemented. The
EPO itself stresses the need for a Community Patent to be agreed, which would be
equivalent to introducing unitary patent protection for the whole territory of the23
European Union (European Commission, n.d. ). First, in the absence of any legal
authority at European level, the establishment of legal certainty is the main
requirement if a Community Patent is to be effective. The arrangements for settling
legal disputes involving Community and European patents have yet to be discussed,
and may prove problematic. Secondly, inventors and firms have highlighted the
particular need for reasonable translation requirements, which, in turn, is likely to
increase the cost of patent applications.
All of these aspects represent a cost for all types of researchers. If firms are required
to appropriate the potential benefits associated with invention, most of the cost will be
sunk costs in the sense that private companies will have to bear them. Faculty
researchers however, may systematically opt for publications, preferring not to incur
the costs associated with the multiplicities of the patent systems that must be dealt
with. This in part explains the lower patenting activity of European universities
compared to their American counterparts. Because the costs greatly outweigh the
benefits a researcher may expect to enjoy from patenting, a researcher will rationally
opt for basic research. This conclusion positively echoes the more qualitative analysis
carried out by Owen-Smith and Powell (2001).
Introduction of a Grace Period
Much has been written about a grace period, not least because such a mechanism
would possibly reconcile researchers’ behaviour vis-à-vis their main objective of
knowledge dissemination. The grace period is a legal device to allow the patenting
activity of university researchers to potentially become compatible with the
publishing standards of Open Science. In order to correctly understand both the scope
and the goal of the grace period, it is necessary to briefly outline the current patent
law in several countries.
Countries in Europe created their own legal context on the basis of the Paris
Convention (1883) for the Protection of Industrial Property. The core principle of the
convention is the first-to-file system: that is, the person that receives Intellectual
Protection is the first to file an application, regardless of whether s/he is the original
inventor. For an invention to be patentable, it must be considered new insofar as it
does not form part of the state-of-the-art (article 54 of the Paris Convention). Subject24
to certain exceptions, public disclosure constitutes a prejudicial antecedent that
annihilates its novelty, thus preventing subsequent patent application. There are,
however, some non-prejudicial types of disclosure that, for a given period of time, do
not compromise the future patent application: “(i) an evident abuse in relation to the
applicant or his legal predecessor; (ii) the fact that the applicant or his legal
predecessor has displayed the invention at an official or officially recognised,
international exhibition …” (art. 55).
Unless otherwise stated, publications constitute a prejudicial form of disclosure for
any patentable knowledge. This means that each is incompatible and is excludable
and, in the terms of the model above, means that patents are the sole function of the
time spent on applied research a and publications are the function of only the time
spent on basic research b. Knowledge that could be either published or patented
presents an immediate dilemma for the researcher, for publication whether in
scientific journals, at conferences or during seminars is de facto prejudicial to the
subsequent filing of patent applications. Thus, in cases where knowledge can be
codified in either publications or patents, a tension is likely to arise.
18 A solution
would be to include scientific publication in the non-prejudicial disclosures, thereby
allowing researchers to divulge their scientific theories without prejudicial delay - at
least for a certain period of time.  The grace period is understood as “a specific period
of time preceding the filing of a patent application during which disclosure by any
means … for which the patent application is filed by the inventor or his/her successor
in title do not constitute prior art in respect of the patent application at hand” (Strauss,
2002). It is significant that public disclosure does not constitute a priority date in that
no immunity is provided against parallel development during that period, although
public disclosure constitutes prior art for any third party willing to patent.
Recently, the idea of a grace period has gained momentum as it aims to reconcile the
growing awareness of the economic value of scientific knowledge with the secular,
primary and Mertonian value of Open Science. Thus, in 1998, the EPO sought the
                                                          
18 Another condition is still necessary for the tension to arise. As Monotti (2002) notes, “An inventor
may perceive the patent route as less scholarly and therefore prejudicial for promotion. … He may be
unwilling to expend the necessary time in developing the invention and prefer to pursue other
fundamental research questions. … He may be a purist whose only research motivation is to advance
knowledge through open discussion.” (p. 476).25
opinions of two experts on the introduction of a grace period in European Patent Law.
The view of M. Galama, one of the experts consulted, was that such a mechanism
would introduce a higher level of uncertainty in the protection of inventions because
early publication could be exploited by a third party, thereby reducing or even
negating the potential benefits of the inventions. Should faculty researchers want to
benefit economically from their research, they must invoke the rules of intellectual
property protection already in place. Professor Strauss, the other expert, took a
different view. He argued that such a legal period of grace is already provided for in
38 countries, including the USA, Japan, Australia, and three candidate countries for
accession to the European Union. For these countries the grace period does not seem
to have created any major uncertainties, which is probably linked to the fact that this
legal tool is not frequently used (see Nelson, 2001). This is consistent with the fact
that faculty researchers in the countries in question are increasingly being asked to
patent their discoveries.
The perceived effects of the introduction of a grace period were explored further in a
European Commission report on the implications for basic genetic engineering
research of failure to publish patentable inventions (EC, 2002). A total of 1,500
questionnaires was sent to public and private researchers, only 240 of which were
completed. The results reflect the divergence of opinion: faculty researchers are
strongly in favour of the grace period, while industry researchers are strongly against
it. The industry argument is that the grace period does not include any priority date,
that is, protection, for the published invention. The priority date remains the date of
patent application. Therefore, industry researchers would be more likely to use the
provisional patent application. A provisional patent application allows the applicant to
obtain a filing date without fulfilling the formal requirements involved in a completed
patent application, while conferring on the applicant a regular filing date. This filing
date offers intellectual protection, provided that a patent is subsequently granted to the
applicant. In the meantime, the researcher is free to disclose her/his invention without
prejudice to its patentability.
Typically, the objective of the grace period would be to reconcile the time spent on
applied research a with the time spent on basic research b. Clearly, this would only
apply if the research in question could result in both a patent and a scientific26
publication. This is tantamount to assuming that time spent on applied research a is
not clearly distinguishable from time spent on basic research b, i.e. a ∩  b ≠  ∅ . Only
certain scientific fields would fall into this category, for instance, biotechnology.
19 It
is also now necessary to distinguish between the type of research being undertaken -
basic or applied,
20 - with the time spent in actually codifying the produced knowledge.
Suppose, for example, that the time spent on basic research consists of time spent
performing the research br and time spent on codification for publication bc, so that b
= br + bc. Suppose, also, that the time spent on applied research consists of time spent
doing applied research ar and time spent on codification into a patent application ac,
so that a = ar + ac. Leaving aside the possible overlap between br and ar, it is worth
questioning the nature of the activity involved in codification. According to the
European Commission report on the causes of publication failure (EC 2002), the level
of scientific expertise and codification experience required for patent applications is
far less than that required for scientific publication. Thus, learning both how and when
to patent should be a minor cost for scientists. Many faculty researchers contest this
view. When asked for their opinions recently on policies supporting university
patenting in Europe, practitioners indicated that writing a publication is quite different
from writing a patent application. One interviewee noted that:
This whole desire to make a university researcher apply for patents
does not make sense. We are trained to do research. We are trained
to explain what we do in our research, so that experiments can be
done elsewhere, on the basis of what is written, and if possible
without direct interactions. Thus the whole exercise in publication is
to narrow down the range of phenomena for which the experiment
holds, and to foster its duplication in any other place in the world.
Instead, we are asked to write patent applications, but the exercise is
absolutely opposite. University researchers must think of the whole
range of possible applications so as to be able to claim for as many
situations as possible. University researchers are not trained for that
                                                          
19 The story of the biotechnology firm, Cetus, offers ample examples of the tensions between
publishing and patenting that can arise. Cetus was created in 1971, and turned to biotechnology at the
end of that decade. The successful development of the Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR) gave rise to a
patent application in 1985 and later publications, though both proved problematic within the firm (see
Rabinow, 1996).27
at all. (Interview with University Researcher in Barcelona, June
2002).
The above may be brief, but contains very important information about the activity of
public, i.e. university, researchers. The grace period is likely to have little effect on
university researchers due to the traditional incentive system in universities and
natural disposition of researchers to publish their results. Policies that try to enforce
university patenting must allow for the costs inherent in learning to write patent
applications.
Diverging paths in a world of skew-distributed outcomes.
Policies that encourage university patenting have also been reinforced by the
considerable decrease in structural funding for universities. With the erosion of public
funding, universities are being forced to find alternative financial resources. These
financial resources include, among others, competitive grants allocated through
publicly funded programmes and support obtained through collaborations with large
firms - typical in the pharmaceuticals industry. The increase in university patenting is
also seen as providing an additional source of funding in the form of royalties.
Empirical figures on university licences for Europe being almost non-existent, we
have little information about university licensing and its revenue. In the case of three
US universities (University of California, Stanford University and Columbia
University), Mowery, Nelson, Sampat and Ziedonis (2001) have observed an
exponential growth in licensing revenues since the mid-eighties (see table 2).
Although this suggests that licences do ensure a substantial share of extra-structural
funding, it appears that these particular universities are in the minority. In fact, in
most universities’ budgets the operating costs of their TTOs significantly outweigh
the revenues from licences. We would agree with Nelson (2001) when he states that it
is a myth that universities can expect a lot of money to result from their patenting and
licensing activities.
                                                                                                                                                                     
20 This is equivalent to assuming that such a distinction holds.28
The above is fairly consistent with the fact that useful inventions are inherently rare.
From table 2, we can see that the largest share of revenues is captured by the top five
inventions. As noted by Sherer and Harhoff (2001), the value of invention and
innovation follows a highly skewed distribution: “most innovations yield modest
returns, and the size distribution has a long thin tail encompassing a relatively few
innovations with particularly high returns” (p. 559). This raises the question of
geographic dispersion or concentration of the most valuable inventions. We would
maintain that the fact that valuable inventions are rare does not preclude their being
geographically concentrated. The published empirical results on spillovers repeatedly
stresses the fact that knowledge is a public good that primarily benefits the immediate
locale. It follows that most valuable inventions trigger additional valuable inventions
at the local level. Assuming a similar geographical concentration of licences, it is
likely that the vast majority of universities will, following Nelson (2001), maintain
non-profitable TTOs, and only a few will enjoy any financial benefits.
{Table 2 ABOUT HERE}
Most inventions are not sufficiently profitable to generate enough revenue to
counteract the decrease in structural funds. Science policies must recognise that the
world of science is a skew-distributed world and that structure is inherent –i.e. it is the
result of dispersed probabilistic outcomes far more than the variance in effort or
competencies of the universities. In the face of little or no evidence, we see no reason
why the well-recognised Matthew effect in science discovery should not be equally
relevant to economically valuable inventions. For policy makers, the problem is the
financial resources of universities. The reduction in structural funds produces great
financial difficulties for most universities while benefiting only a few. In turn, because
the value of inventions is difficult or impossible to forecast, policy makers should
promote diversity of research both in basic and applied research, bearing in mind that
first, most seeds do not bear fruit and second, that no method exists to discriminate
between fertile and infertile seeds.
Representation of the value of licences following a skew-distribution suggests that
only a few universities are likely to win, while the majority will eventually get poorer
through the expensive daily conduct of their technology transfer and patenting offices.29
This is consistent with the model developed by Jensen and Thursby, which is based on
the assumption that researchers do not benefit from their patenting experience.
21
Therefore, initial differences across researchers persist. It follows that ill-considered
institutional arrangements may prove very costly in terms of basic research, applied
research, patents and technology transfer.
Is the Win-it-All/Lose-it-All Scenario Likely to Occur?
The representation of the value of licences following a skew-distribution suggests that
only a few universities are likely to win it all, while the majority of universities will
eventually become poorer through the expensive daily running of their technology
transfer and patenting offices.
22
To create a more dynamic model, let us now introduce a learning curve of the simplest
form. Bayesian learning in patenting implies that the ultimate value of a patent is a
positive function of past experience. This implies that the researcher can expect a
much higher return on investment in applied research. What is the effect, in the long
run, of the basic or applied nature of research activities chosen by the researcher? To
answer this would need the development of another model. However, a recent paper
by Paula Stephan and colleagues (Stephan et al. 2003)
23 has addressed the issue of
crowding out of publications by patents at the level of researchers. Using a sample of
10,962 individual doctoral scientists, the authors found evidence that the effect of an
additional publication on patents is positive and significant. This suggests that there is
no substitution effect of patent for publications. Besides, this effect is more
pronounced for scientific disciplines such as life sciences, physical sciences and, to a
lesser extent, engineering. No such effect is detectable for computer sciences. Besides,
the number of patents is a function of the experience of the researcher. One very
interesting result is that tenured faculty patent significantly less than non-tenured
faculty, which indicates that patenting activity is an increasing function of the
                                                          
21 This assumption is crucial because it leads researchers to favour “publishing” over “patenting”.
Consequently, the mrsab is decreasing in a and increasing in b.
22 This is also consistent with the model developed by Jensen and Thursby which is based on the
assumption that researchers do not benefit from their past patenting experience. This assumption is
crucial because it leads researchers to favour “publishing” over “patenting”. Consequently, the mrsab is
decreasing in a and increasing in b.
23 We are grateful to the authors who have given us access to the first draft of unpublished work.30
seniority of the position. Clearly, the incentive structure for both types of faculty is
different.
There is thus evidence that publications and patents are complements rather than
substitutes. Also, there is evidence that researchers do learn how to patent, the results
of this learning being likely to result in more patent applications in the later phases of
their careers. An analogue study has been done at the level of institutional learning. In
this case, universities may or may not accumulate patenting expertise, thus closing up
the gap, or not, with initially higher patenting universities. The question of learning to
patent and accumulated institutional experience was investigated in the context of US
universities after the Bayh-Dole Act of 1981 (Mowery, Nelson, Sampat and Ziedonis,
2001). Their findings can be summarised as follows: (i) the authors find little evidence
of a decline in the quality of university patenting for incumbent universities for the
period under investigation; (ii) the quality of patents for entrant universities is catching
up with incumbent universities. This corroborates the idea of the presence of
institutional learning in patent codification and applications. However, the sources of
this institutional learning are hard to locate. The authors test for the presence of (a) a
mere learning-by-doing effect, which is similar to introducing Bayesian learning at the
institutional level; (b) relationships with research corporations; (c) allocation of
administrative talent to technology transfer activities. The lack of significant
relationships with improvements in patenting suggests that the locus of institutional
learning is more diffused.
The effect of both personal and institutional learning to patent on university research
suggests that the patenting activity might go hand-in-hand with publication. It should
be noted, however, that the linkage of patenting with both reputation and additional
funding in the form of licences, is equally likely to increase inter-university
differences in terms of financial resources. If more successful universities are able to
gather a larger financial base, they may also choose to reinvest licence revenues in
basic research. In turn, the fact that publication and patents are complementary, means
that the Matthew effect in patenting is likely to overlap with the Matthew effect in
publication, making way for an even clearer win-it-all/lose-it-all scenario.31
The discussion on the analytical models presented above clearly stresses that the
abstract representation of the decisions of researchers to publish or patent is seen as
relevant for analysis of the short-term consequences of increased patenting. The
analytical approach of Jensen and Thursby does not identify a process of substitution,
or crowding-out, between patenting and publishing activities. This is consistent with
the results of the work of Stephan et al. (2003), which suggests that the most
productive researchers in terms of publishing are also those with the most patents,
although the scope of complementarity is likely to differ significantly across scientific
fields. Furthermore, the analytical approach of Jensen and Thursby does carry the
caveat that an increase in applied research is likely to have negative consequences for
the quality of education dispensed by faculties. Human capital takes a long time to
acquire and implies a large share of sunk costs. The problem with increasing
dependence on licences to finance a department is that it increases the dependence of
universities on the immediate utility of research output. Assuming that this equates in
some cases to short-term research, the danger of making structural funds scarcer
overtime is that this may lead to a decrease in the quality of education, and thus to a
loss in human capital.
The analytical model discussed above also demonstrates that in Europe, policies
aimed at increasing university patenting are likely to become very costly because
researchers will spend a large proportion of their time dealing with the legal and
organisational niceties instead of doing research. First, policies aiming at increasing
university patenting should encompass a simplified legal system that would allow
researchers to benefit from intellectual property rights on a larger geographical scale.
This would significantly reduce the cost structure of university patenting, although, of
course, the same benefits would also apply to firms. Second, macro policies in favour
of university patenting are likely to have little impact if they are not accompanied by
corresponding investment in development of technology transfer expertise at the level
of universities. Empirical evidence from Europe points to a dramatic lack of expertise
in TTOs at the local level. Third, the grace period is likely to impact on the activities
of researchers in only those areas where basic research cannot be clearly differentiated
from applied research, because the logic of a grace period relies explicitly on the fact
that the same (group of) results become simultaneously publishable and patentable.
Typically, the grace period is more directly related to disciplines like biotechnology32
and/or information technology, while making little difference in disciplines such as
the physical sciences.
5. Conclusions: key issues for future empirical assessments
“To understand whether concerns about the scientific and economic impacts of
strategic IP behaviour are valid, governments, researchers and other stakeholders need
more information on the quantity and quality of IP actually under management at
PROs” (OECD, 2002b; p. 198), Chapter 6 of the OECD ST&I Outlook 2002, devoted
to patenting and licensing in PROS, concludes. Our research confirms and further
reinforces this conclusion. Currently, the data on university patenting available for the
European countries are unreliable and are not useful for assessing the potential impact
upon open research of an increased strategic IP behaviour or PROs.
Most of the current debate is based on a one-off observation or ideology, for example
policy and practitioner documents (mainly those of TO managers) quite often state
that considerable innovation potential goes unused because PROs do not take out
patents on their discoveries. The causality between not taking patents and less
innovation has not been proved: it is only assumed. Statements like: “a lot of great
inventions could have emerged if only they had not been hidden in university closets”
(in Agres, 2002) misrepresent the process of knowledge transfer from the university
and the process of knowledge acquisitions by firms. Indeed, if this view were fact it
would mean that firms would be unable to read and understand the published results
of scientific research developed by researchers in universities and other public and
private research organisations; it makes the implicit assumption that firms do not have
any scientific and technological knowledge, which is clearly not the case.
The view that universities are ivory towers that produce academic output disconnected
from technology is rhetoric that is not supported by evidence. In fact, the few studies
available on university patenting in Europe show convincingly that university
invented patents were and are an important phenomenon: researchers did and do
produce research relevant to technological development as proven by the fact that
they were and are included in the inventor lists of industrial owned patents. As is the
case in the US (Mowery et al. 2001, Mowery and Sampat, 2001), university patenting
in Europe is not a new phenomenon and did not require specific policy incentives to33
be developed. In the two countries for which historical data on university invented
patents are available (Germany and Italy) and in the other countries for which some
information is available (Belgium, Finland and the UK), it seems that the increase in
university patenting has been due more to the opportunities in the bio-medical field
than to any new policy action. The developments probably occurred later in Europe
than the US due to the later development of research in the bio-medical area in the
European countries.
Given the first conclusion of Chapter 6 of the OECD ST&I Outlook 2002 quoted
above, it is puzzling that, on the same page, the report tentatively concludes that: “for
many OECD countries, fears that PRO IP activities will distort the public scientific
endeavour are premature” (OECD, 2002b; p. 198). The data from the OECD IP
survey, though interesting, do not provide enough evidence to support this assertion.
These conflicting statements are symptomatic of the current debate in which people
and organisations, though aware of the lack of empirical evidence to support any
serious conclusions, claim to have evidence to support their assumptions. Given
current policy activity across European countries in support of more active use of IP
in PROs, there is an urgent need for more reliable and more useful data (on a time
series basis) to be collected, not only on IP activity but also on the inputs and outputs
of the other activities carried out by researchers and research organisations. Only a
broad analysis including the various activities carried out by university researchers in
research, TT, teaching and administration can provide the correct framework to shed
some light on these issues.
Some literature argues that increased university IPR has not tilted the balance between
applied and basic research. For example, referring to the results of studies by Zucker
and Darby (1996) and Louis et al. (2001) that provide evidence that entrepreneurial
scientists (researchers with a track record of technology transfer activity) have high
scientific productivity, Poyago-Theotoky et al. (2002) maintain that TT activity does
not divert from basic research. Given the difficulty of defining basic and applied
research in the ‘transfer sciences’ (Blume, 1990) or ‘Pasteur’s Quadrant’ sciences
(Stokes, 1997), and especially in the areas of biotechnology where university
patenting is currently most important, we do not feel comfortable with these
conclusions. The major problem with them is that publications span the whole34
spectrum from basic to applied research, so a high publication output it is not a priori
a good indicator of the basicness of the research. Thus the generalisation that
‘interestingly, some preliminary evidence appears to contradict the conventional
wisdom that university technology transfer reduces the quantity and quality of basic
research performed by academics’ (Poyago-Theotoky et al. 2002: p.18,) is misleading.
Much more detailed research on different scientific fields and more detailed output
indicators would be needed to reach such a conclusion. For example, it would be
useful to classify publications using the Computer Horizons Inc. (CHI) journal
classification in four major categories of research - applied technology, engineering
technological science, applied research and basic research.
The empirical evidence on publishing and patenting available mostly for the US,
shows that for a subset of scientists working in the bio-medical area, there has been no
substitution effect between TT and publishing. That is, it provides evidence to
confirm that in the bio-medical field, as in other transfer sciences, it is not possible,
and not useful, to make a clear distinction between the activities and outputs of basic
research and applied research; the boundaries between basic research and applied
research are blurred and researchers can produce outputs that are of relevance to both
science and technology without damaging their reputation in science or affecting the
exploitability of their discoveries.
The preliminary evidence put forward in this paper allows us to highlight four main
issues that require attention in any future empirical assessment. First, though
European universities’ institutional patenting is low, university invented patents seem
to be relevant at least in the bio-medical area. Any policy action aiming at creating
incentives for ‘more efficient’ technology transfer via university patenting should take
into account the pre-existing phenomenon of university invented patents.
Second, there is a need for more comparable data across European countries that
acknowledge the institutional specificities in different countries. A possible
interpretation in the case of European countries of the conclusion of the analytical
models discussed above points out that policies aiming at increasing university
patenting in Europe are likely to become very costly if they do not encompass a
simplified legal system that would allow researchers to benefit from intellectual35
property rights on a larger geographical scale. The fragmentation of the European
patent law system together with the intensive and increasing cross-country research
activity can produce serious problems. It lowers incentives for researchers to patent at
the European level due to the high costs of translation. It also greatly complicates pan-
European collaborative tasks in European Universities. Consider a collaborative
project between two members of a university-CNRS ‘unité’ mixte’ in France, a
Professor and a PhD student in the UK, two professors and three PhD students in
Italy, and a Dutch professor, working together with a multinational firms. One can
imagine the potential conflicting and complex issues arising in the case of a highly
valuable patent deriving from such a contract.
Third, in the US and Canada there has been wide ranging debate on the conflicts of
interest that fostered the development of strong regulation to protect the more
traditional role of the university in contributing to open knowledge (Argyres and
Porter Liebeskind, 1998; Kondro, 2001). From the available evidence, research
papers, green papers and opinion papers, etc., it seems that such issues do not reach
the same audience in Europe as in the US. There is an urgent need for the
development of codes of conduct that would help researchers to manage conflicting
pressures. In Europe some discussion has focused on the introduction of a grace
period. It is important to underscore that a grace period is likely to have unequal
effects across scientific disciplines. In disciplines where the distinction between basic
and applied sciences is clear (e.g. the physical sciences), the introduction of a grace
period is likely to have very little, if not non-existent effects. In disciplines where the
distinction between basic and applied sciences is more blurred (e.g. biotechnology),
the introduction of a grace period is likely to have a considerable impact possibly
reducing some of the conflict of interest.
Fourth, substituting short-term funds and licences for structural funds carries two
types of threat. In the short run, it is likely that the net difference in the financial
resources on which universities may base their activities will be negative for the vast
majority. Although the scope of the net loss of financial, and thus research, resources
may, in turn, not be dramatic for most, it is not clear what the consequences for basic
research and teaching may turn out to be. Neither is it clear who between the students
or the universities will support the financial gap. In the long run, cumulative effects36
are likely to exacerbate differences between universities. Universities with low
revenues from royalties will be penalised in order to spur them to come up with future
highly valuable inventions. Universities with high revenues from royalties will be able
to enjoy above normal research budgets that will allow them to implement above
normal research projects.
Finally, most of current policy action in the area of university IPR is grounded on the
assumption that university patents facilitate technology transfer and, thus, increase the
innovation potential of an economy. The survey of the literature carried out for this
paper does not provide any conclusive evidence that patenting is an efficient device
for transferring technologies and know-how. There is empirical and theoretical
evidence both in support of (Poyago-Theotoky et al., 2002) and against (Nelson,
2001) the view that university patenting would accelerate commercialisation. Current
policies to support university patenting may well create incentives that could change
the behaviour of researchers. These policies are based upon weak empirical evidence
thus more research is needed to assess the efficiency of university patenting in
technology transfer rather than assuming it.37
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Table 1: Perception of Patent Outcomes by Faculty researchers
Outcome Physical Sciences Life Sciences
Protection Limits restraints on
communication
Enables commercialisation
Limits actions of foreign
competitors
Protects academic freedom from
commercially held patents
Enables commercialisation
required for drug development
Keeps findings from being
‘robbed’
Keeps faculty from being
‘skinned’ by firms
Keeps faculty from missing the
‘golden egg’
Leverage Enables requests for funds from
deans, department chairs
Leads to consulting and sponsored
research
Aids in having federal grants by
getting private equipment
Helps convince firms to pay for
development research




Helps forwards ‘basic science’
thinking
Serving the public good
Fighting disease
Increased prestige
Helps forwards ‘basic science’
thinking
Education Helps students get jobs
Reading/writing patents,
negotiations as professional skills
Source: Owen-Smith and Powell (2001).42
Table 2: Licensing income-1970-1995 for three US universities
University 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995
University of California
Gross Income (1992$ × 10
3) 1,140.4 1,470.7 2,113.9 3,914.3 13,240.4 58,556.0
Share of top 5 inventions 79 73 51 47 55 66
Stanford University
Gross Income (1992$ × 10
3) 180.4 842.6 1084.4 4890.9 14,757.5 35,833.1
Share of top 5 inventions 69 86 69 76 85
Columbia University
Gross Income (1992$ × 10
3) 542 6,903.5 31,790.3
Share of top 5 inventions 99 92 94
Source: Mowery, et. al (2001).